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DOES A MARRIAGE REALLY NEED SEX?:
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE GENDER
RESTRICTION ON MARRIAGE
Randi E. Frankle*
INTRODUCTION
Marriage seems like an uncomplicated institution at first blush.
Many people, beginning in childhood, think that marriage is some-
thing for which they should strive as a routine part of adult life. It
seems that much of a person's life, particularly in the younger
years, is devoted to finding that "special someone." A problem
often arises, however, when that special someone is not who soci-
ety expects, such as when that person is of the same-sex, is
transsexual, or the individual is intersex. 1 The topic of marriage
then seems to become extremely complicated.
Opponents of same-sex marriage argue that marriage should re-
main limited to a union between one man and one woman.2 This
definition categorically excludes homosexuals, transsexuals, and,
presumably, intersex individuals. The most common rationale for
limiting marriage in this manner, however, is circular: marriage
should be limited to between one man and one woman because
* J.D. candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2004; B.A., History, cum
laude, State University of New York at New Paltz, 2000. I would like to thank Profes-
sor Tracy Higgins for her guidance and insight as well as the editors and staff of the
Fordham Urban Law Journal for helping me shape and polish this Comment. Most of
all, I would like to thank my family, my father for inspiring me to be an overachiever,
my mother for her never ending support, and Matt, Gordon, Gina, and Michelle for
all their support and encouragement throughout this process.
1. An "intersex" individual is someone with ambiguous sex genitalia or both
male and female sex characteristics. TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY
1007 (17 ed. 1993); Laura Hermer, Paradigms Revised: Intersex Children, Bioethics, &
the Law, 11 ANNALS HEALTH L. 195, 195 (2002); see Kishka-Kamari Ford, Note,
"First Do No Harm" - The Fiction of Legal Parental Consent to Normalizing Surgery
on Intersex Infants, 19 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 469, 470 (2001).
2. See, e.g., Anita K. Blair, Constitutional Equal Protection, Strict Scrutiny, and
the Politics of Marriage Law, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 1231, 1238 (1998) (arguing that
defining marriage as between one man and one woman does not abridge anyone's
constitutional rights); George W. Dent, Jr., The Defense of Traditional Marriage, 15
J.L. & POL. 581, 582 (1999) (advocating for limiting marriage to one man and one
woman by attempting to rebut the arguments for recognizing marriage between two
people of the same sex).
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that is the way it has always been.3 Nevertheless, many other long-
standing practices have changed to reflect changing social values.4
The legal limitation on the definition of marriage to the union of
a man and a woman has drawn courts into the difficult business of
adjudicating sexual identity, raising concerns of fairness and indi-
vidual freedom.5 For example, courts have had to determine
whether a transsexual is defined by pre or post-operative sexual
identity.6 Even more problematic are situations involving intersex
individuals. If a person's genitalia or chromosomes are ambiguous,
binary classification into "male" or "female" is virtually impossi-
ble.7 Indeed, an intersex individual may be precluded from legally
marrying anyone because she meets the definition of neither man
nor woman.
8
Marriage is a fundamental right, 9 therefore, it is questionable
that an intersex person could be constitutionally precluded from
exercising that right altogether.' 0 This entire group of people
should not be deprived of their fundamental right to marry merely
because they do not fit the definition of "male" or "female." Nev-
3. See Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 590 (Ky. 1973) (stating that marriage
has always beef- considered as the union of one man and one woman and holding that
there is no constitutional protection of marriage between persons of the same sex);
Anonymous v. Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499, 500 (Sup. Ct. 1971) (noting that mar-
riage has always been defined as between one man and one woman); Lynn D. Wardle,
Legal Claims for Same-Sex Marriage: Efforts to Legitimate a Retreat from Marriage by
Redefining Marriage, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 735, 748-54 (1998) (asserting that marriage,
by definition, is a unique relationship between one man and one woman because het-
erosexual marriage has always been the preferred relationship); see also Anne B.
Brown, Note, The Evolving Definition of Marriage, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 917, 943-
44 (1998) (concluding that same-sex marriages should not be legalized because, in
part, polls indicate that a majority of Americans still view marriage as a union be-
tween only one man and one woman). There are also arguments that the fundamen-
tal right to marry does not include same-sex marriage by definition because marriage
is inevitably linked to procreation, which homosexuals cannot do. See Mary Coombs,
Sexual Dis-Orientation: Transgendered People and Same-Sex Marriage, 8 UCLA Wo-
MEN'S L.J. 219, 224-26 (1998) (acknowledging some of the arguments advanced by
opponents of same-sex marriage).
4. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (invalidating Virginia's racial
restriction on marriage); see also Brown v. Bd. of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483,
493 (1954) (holding school segregation unconstitutional). These practices, preventing
interracial marriages and prohibiting racially integrated schools, were long-standing
practices that no longer reflected society's values.
5. See infra Parts I.A., C.
6. See infra Part I.C.
7. See Hermer, supra note 1, at 195-96 (noting the difficulties that arise when
classifying an infant with ambiguous genitalia into binary categories).
8. See infra Part I.C.l.b.
9. See infra Part I.A.1.
10. See infra Part II.A.1.
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ertheless, because they do not fit these definitions, there are con-
siderable problems in determining whom they are legally able to
marry." The question then is, who is the "opposite sex" of an in-
tersex person for the purposes of marriage?
Part I of this Comment discusses the constitutional protection of
the right to marry, intersex conditions, and case law regarding in-
tersex, transsexual, and same-sex marriage. Part II discusses the
consequences for marriage when it is narrowly defined, not only
for intersex people, homosexuals, and transsexuals, but also for
heterosexuals. Part III presents the resolution reached by most
courts and proposes an alternative solution. Part III also asserts
that because an intersex person is a combination of both male and
female characteristics, she should be able to self-designate her gen-
der and, even if she has physical characteristics that are mostly fe-
male,12 be able to marry either a man or a woman. Further, this
Comment argues that if an intersex person can marry either a man
or a woman, then a male-to-female transsexual and a genetic wo-
man 13 must also be able to marry either a man or a woman because
all are similarly situated and must be treated alike under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Constitutional Protection of Marriage
1. The Fundamental Right of Marriage
For over sixty years, beginning with Skinner v. Oklahoma, the
United States Supreme Court has recognized that the right to
marry is a "basic civil right."14 Generally, classifying a right as a
basic civil right means that the exercise of that right cannot be un-
reasonably burdened by the government.1 5 Further, both Loving v.
Virginia1 6 and Zablocki v. Redhail7 reaffirmed the Court's holding
11. See infra Part II.A.1.
12. Many intersex conditions result in female physical characteristics. See infra
Part I.B.
13. The terms "genetic man" or "genetic woman" will be used to refer to persons
whose gender identity, sex at birth, and chromosomes conform.
14. 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). Although the case before the Court involved a mar-
riage between a genetic male and a genetic female, the Court did not specifically hold
that this type of marriage is the only type that is constitutionally protected. Id.
15. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384-87(1978) (holding that the
right to marry is of fundamental importance and invalidating a Wisconsin statute be-
cause it unreasonably burdened that right).
16. 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
17. 434 U.S. at 383.
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in Skinner, stating that "marriage is a fundamental right" and giv-
ing the right to marry constitutional protection. 18 Marriage is a
fundamental right that everyone should be able to exercise and, at
least, can exercise when in a seemingly heterosexual relationship.
Problems arise, however, when a person attempts to exercise that
right in an untraditional manner, that is, attempting to marry some-
one who is not of the "opposite sex." Nonetheless, marriage re-
mains a fundamental right and cannot be unreasonably impinged
upon.19
The Supreme Court has consistently held that if a statute or clas-
sification affects a fundamental right, heightened judicial scrutiny is
required.2 ° In Zablocki, the Court stated that since the right to
marry is of fundamental importance, a "classification that signifi-
cantly interferes with the exercise of that right" requires "critical
examination of the state interests advanced. 21 When a fundamen-
tal right is affected, any classification that has no bearing on the
asserted state interest or that is deliberately discriminatory will not
be upheld.22
18. Id.
19. Id. at 386; see also City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 113 (1980) (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (stating that "if a classification impinges upon a fundamental right ex-
plicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution ... strict judicial scrutiny is
required.").
20. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 383. Heightened judicial scrutiny indicates that the
Court is using more than mere rational basis review. In this context specifically, the
Court required the statute be "supported by sufficiently important state interests and
is closely tailored to effectuate only those interests." Id. at 388; see also Cent. State
Univ. v. Am. Ass'n of Univ. Professors, 526 U.S. 124, 127-28 (1999) (noting that the
Court has "repeatedly held" that unless a classification involves a fundamental right,
no heightened scrutiny is required); Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992) (stating
that the equal protection clause requires heightened scrutiny if the exercise of a fun-
damental right is jeopardized); Attorney General of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476
U.S. 898, 906 n.6 (1986) (stating, "where a law classifies in such a way as to infringe
[on] constitutionally protected fundamental rights, heightened scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause is required."); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473
U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (stating that heightened scrutiny is required "... when state laws
impinge on personal rights protected by the Constitution.").
21. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 383 (internal quotations omitted).
22. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996) (holding that a "bare desire to harm
a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.");
Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 406 (Stevens, J., concurring); see Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78,
97 (1986) (holding unconstitutional a regulation that prohibited prisoners from mar-
rying because it unreasonably burdened the right to marry and was not sufficiently
related to the state's penological interests).
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2. Marriage and Equal Protection
A discussion of marriage and its categorical limitations necessa-
rily implicates the Equal Protection Clause. 23 Equal protection ju-
risprudence dictates that "all persons similarly situated should be
treated alike. '24 Depending on the classification at issue, courts
use different levels of scrutiny: race-based classifications require
strict scrutiny;25 gender-based classifications are subject to interme-
diate scrutiny; 26 and all other classifications must merely pass a ra-
tional basis review.27 In addition, a classification or restriction
which burdens a fundamental right will be subject to heightened
scrutiny even if the classification does not involve a suspect class,
such as race or gender.28
In Zablocki, the Supreme Court stated that a classification that
significantly interferes with a person's ability to exercise a funda-
mental right "cannot be upheld unless it is supported by suffi-
ciently important state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate
23. The Fourteenth Amendment states, in part: "No State shall ... deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Any restriction placed on marriage, therefore, must be applied equally to all similarly
situated persons. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2486 (2003)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that treating the "same conduct differently based
solely on the participants" violates the Equal Protection Clause and concluding that
moral disapproval alone cannot, and has not ever been, "a legitimate government
interest under the Equal Protection Clause because legal classifications cannot be
drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by the law."); Eisenstadt
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447 (1972) (stating that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits a
state from legislating different treatment of persons on the basis of an arbitrary or
unreasonable classification).
24. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484 (O'Connor, J., concurring); City of Cleburne, 473
U.S. at 439.
25. Strict scrutiny is defined as requiring a compelling governmental interest and a
narrowly tailored statute. Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989)
(holding that the Equal Protection Clause requires strict scrutiny of all race-based
classifications).
26. A statute meets intermediate scrutiny if there is an important governmental
objective and the means are substantially related to that objective. Nguyen v. I.N.S.,
533 U.S. 53, 60-61 (2001) (stating that gender-based classifications must pass interme-
diate scrutiny).
27. Rational basis review is satisfied if the statute is reasonably related to a legiti-
mate government interest. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 357
(2001) (stating that rational basis review is properly applied to general social and
economic legislation). The Court has, however, used "a more searching form of ra-
tional basis review" in some circumstances, such as where "the challenged legislation
inhibits personal relationships," to strike down legislation under the Equal Protection
Clause. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2485 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
28. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 388; see supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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only those interests. '29 Classifications that burden the fundamen-
tal right to marry, particularly when applied to similarly situated
persons, must be examined under this level of heightened scru-
tiny.3° The state must demonstrate an important interest and the
legislation must be closely tailored to serve that interest. 31 This is
the standard the Supreme Court sets in Zablocki.32 At times,
courts have circumvented standards and tests that would otherwise
seem to apply where homosexuality or gender nonconformity are
concerned.33 It is possible that the Court would define the right to
marry as narrowly as the right to marry a person of the opposite
sex, or even as the right to marry a person with opposite chromo-
somes, but thus far has defined the right as the right to marry.34
a. A Brief Overview of Same-Sex Marriage Jurisprudence
There have been several cases challenging the denial of marriage
licenses to same-sex couples. The national debate on this issue,
however, was not sparked until 1993, when the Hawaii Supreme
Court held that the denial of a marriage license to a same-sex
couple, based on the sex of each partner, presumptively violated
the state constitution's equal protection clause.36 The court held
the restriction was a classification based on sex and treated it as a
suspect class for purposes of the state constitution's equal protec-
tion clause.37 The restriction, therefore, was subject to strict scru-
29. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 388. The Court has also held that classifications that
"invade or restrain" fundamental rights asserted under the Equal Protection Clause
"must be closely scrutinized and carefully confined." Harper v. Virginia State Board
of Elections, 383 U.S. 633, 669 (1966).
30. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 383.
31. Id. at 388.
32. Id.
33. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986) (defining the privacy
right asserted extremely narrowly, as the right to engage in homosexual sodomy, in
order to uphold a Georgia anti-sodomy statute instead of following the trend of previ-
ous privacy cases), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2483 (2003); Lit-
tleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 231 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999) (stating that the court was
relying on the multi-factor test, but relying primarily on presumed chromosomes);
Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 57-58 (Haw. 1993) (defining the privacy right asserted as
the right to same-sex marriage, instead of the right to marry).
34. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 383; see infra Part I.A.2.a.
35. See, e.g., Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Ky. 1973); Singer v. Hara, 522
P.2d 1187, 1188 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
36. HAW. CONST. art 1, § 5; Baehr, 852 P.2d at 67.
37. HAW. CONST. art 1, § 5; Baehr, 852 P.2d at 63-64.
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tiny.38 Hawaii has since passed a constitutional amendment
banning same-sex marriage, 39 but the court's decision sparked a fe-
verish debate between advocates of same-sex marriage and its
opponents.n0
Advocates of same-sex marriage present several arguments.41
One of the central arguments is a due process claim; marriage is a
fundamental right, and same-sex couples should be able to exercise
that right.42 This argument, however, failed in the courts.43 Courts
frame the right as a "right to same-sex marriage" instead of simply
the right to marry.4 4 In Baehr, the court acknowledges the funda-
mental right to marry, but states that the right to same-sex mar-
riage is not "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" or "so
rooted in the traditions and collective conscience of our people"
that it should have constitutional protection.45
Other arguments, grounded in gender discrimination 46 and equal
protection claims, have also failed.47 According to this argument,
38. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 63-64. The court remanded holding that the State must
assert a compelling interest and the statute must be narrowly tailored in order to be
valid under the state constitution. Id. at 67-68.
39. HAW. CONST. art 1, § 23 (stating "[t]he legislature shall have the power to re-
serve marriage to opposite-sex couples"). The Hawaii legislature limited marriage to
opposite sex couples by declaring that the only valid marriage contract shall be be-
tween a man and a woman. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 572-1 (1998).
40. For example, scholars and commentators wrote numerous articles advocating
for the freedom to marry while Congress subsequently enacted The Defense of Mar-
riage Act ("DOMA"), which states that no state is required to recognize any same-
sex relationship that is treated as a marriage in any other state. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C
(1996); see Pamela S. Katz, The Case for Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage, 8 J.
L. & POL'Y 61, 62 (1999) (advocating the inclusion of homosexuals in the "marriage
franchise"); Mark Strasser, Loving in the New Millennium: On Equal Protection and
the Right to Marry, 7 U. Cm. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 61, 62 (2000) (arguing that bans
on same-sex marriage are analogous to anti-miscegenation statutes and violate the
Equal Protection Clause).
41. See, e.g., Katz, supra note 40, at 73-97 (discussing the fundamental right aspect
of marriage and the equal protection gender discrimination argument).
42. See Heather Hodges, Dean v. The District of Columbia: Goin' to the Chapel
and We're Gonna Get Married, 5 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 93, 102-04 (1996) (discuss-
ing the advancement of a due process argument); see also Katz, supra note 40, at 73-
77 (discussing the due process claim that marriage is a fundamental right).
43. See, e.g., Baehr, 852 P.2d at 57 (holding that there is no fundamental right to
same-sex marriage); Hodges, supra note 42, at 102-04 (discussing various cases in
which the due process claim was rejected).
44. See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 57.
45. Id.
46. See Katz, supra note 40, at 88-92 (discussing the gender discrimination argu-
ment); see also Strasser, supra note 40, at 74-80 (discussing the ban on same-sex mar-
riage as discrimination on the basis of sex).
47. See, e.g., Hodges, supra note 42, at 118-21 (discussing the decision in Dean v.
District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 363-64 (D.C. 1993), that the ban on same-sex
2013
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by allowing men to marry women, but not allowing women to
marry women, unequal treatment of women as compared to men
exists. 48 Opponents of same-sex marriage argue that men and wo-
men are treated equally because each can marry someone of the
opposite sex.4 9 Although the gender discrimination argument has
failed in the courts, there are still Equal Protection issues yet to be
addressed.5 °
B. Intersex Conditions
An intersex individual has at least one of several conditions that
make determining gender problematic. By definition, an intersex
individual displays physical sex characteristics that are ambiguous,
that is, a combination of male and female characteristics.51 When
ambiguity is present at birth, it can perplex doctors and parents as
they attempt to classify the newborn into one of only two catego-
ries, male or female.52
Several conditions can cause intersexuality. Certain hormonal
disorders, such as androgen insensitivity syndrome ("AIS") and 5-
marriage does not trigger an equal protection claim). Although the Baehr court ac-
knowledged that there was an equal protection problem, the state circumvented this
by adopting a constitutional amendment that allowed the legislature to limit marriage
to opposite sex couples, which they subsequently did. See supra notes 37-39 and ac-
companying text.
48. See Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men
is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197, 216 (1994) (noting the difficulty in dis-
tinguishing between a woman who wishes to be with a woman and a man who wishes
to be with a woman); see also Strasser, supra note 40, at 79 (noting the view that the
ban on same-sex marriage treats men and women alike). The counter-argument is
that both men and women can marry a person of the opposite sex. Dent, supra note
2, at 608 (asserting that traditional marriage treats everyone the same because every-
one may marry a person of the opposite sex). That is, a man who wishes to marry a
woman and a woman who wishes to marry a woman are not considered similarly
situated. See id.
49. See Dent, supra note 2, at 608.
50. For example, it is questionable whether allowing a man to marry a genetic
woman and not allowing the same man to marry a male-to-female transsexual is con-
stitutional because both appear to be similarly situated with their respect to marry an
externally physical female. See Coombs, supra note 3, at 258-260 (discussing the ef-
fect of gender discrimination arguments on the transgendered); see also Shana Brown,
Comment, Sex Changes and "Opposite Sex" Marriage: Applying the Full Faith and
Credit Clause to Compel Interstate Recognition of Transgendered Persons' Amended
Legal Sex for Marital Purposes, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1113, 1152-56 (2001) (discuss-
ing transsexuals right to marry); Kristine J. Namkung, Comment, The Defense of Mar-
riage Act: Sex and the Citizen, 24 U. HAWAII L.REv. 279, 294-304 (2001) (discussing
Equal Protection jurisprudence and the Defense of Marriage Act).
51. TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1007 (17th ed. 1993); Hermer,
supra note 1, at 195-96.
52. Ford, supra note 1, at 470-71.
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Alpha-Reductase Deficiency ("5-A-R D"), cause the external geni-
talia to be incongruent with the individual's chromosomes. 53 Inter-
sexuality can also result from several chromosomal conditions. For
example, an individual may have an unusual number of sex chro-
mosomes, either more than two or only one.54 A person born with
visible, physical ambiguity is also considered intersex on the basis
of that ambiguity.55 In addition, most individuals affected by an
intersex condition are infertile. 6
1. Hormonal Disorders
An individual with either AIS or 5-A-R D usually develops in
utero as a physical female. 57 A fetus affected by AIS has XY
(male) chromosomes and inter-abdominal testes, but is unable to
process androgens. 8 The fetus then develops as a physical female
by default.5 9 In most cases, the child is classified as a genetic fe-
male at birth.60 The disorder is usually not discovered until pu-
berty, when the individual fails to menstruate.61
A second disorder, 5-Alpha-Reductase Deficiency, is similar to
AIS in that the child is designated a genetic female at birth.62 With
5-A-R D, however, the fetus is unable to convert testosterone into
dihydrotestosterone, the hormone which causes the development
53. Hermer, supra note 1, at 206; see also infra Part I.B.1.
54. Katrina Rose, The Transsexual and the Damage Done: The Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals Opens PanDOMA's Box by Closing the Door on Transsexuals' Right
to Marry, 9 LAW & SEXUALITY 1, 16-17 (1999-2000) (noting that an individual with
chromosomes other than XX or XY is considered intersex); see infra Part I.B.2.
55. TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1007 (17th ed. 1993); Hermer,
supra note 1, at 205; see Ford, supra note 1, at 470 (discussing various physical
ambiguities).
56. See Hermer, supra note 1, at 205-09; see also Julie A. Greenberg, Defining
Male and Female: Intersexuality and the Collision Between Law and Biology, 41 ARIZ.
L. REV. 265, 283-88 (1999).
57. Greenberg, supra note 56, at 286-88.
58. Hermer, supra note 1, at 206-07. Androgens are the hormones that are re-
sponsible for the development of secondary male sex characteristics. Medical Dic-
tionary at http://www.medical-dictionary.com (last visited April 5, 2003); see Intersex
Society of North America, What Is Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome?, at http://
www.isna.org/faq/faq-ais.html (last visited April 5, 2003). This disorder affects ap-
proximately 1 in 13,000 chromosomal males. See Intersex Society of North America,
Frequency: How Common Are Intersex Conditions?, at http://www.isna.org/faq/fre-
quency.html (last visited April 5, 2003).
59. Greenberg, supra note 56, at 288.
60. Hermer, supra note 1, at 206-07.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 207.
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of male genitalia, so the fetus develops ambiguous genitalia.63 A
person affected with 5-A-R D is usually raised as a female. 64 Dur-
ing puberty, however, the body will masculinize and the disorder is
discovered.6 5
Another hormonal disorder, congenital adrenal hyperplasia
("CAH"), occurs when a chromosomal female 66 is exposed to ab-
normally high amounts of androgens during fetal development. 67
The individual usually has a fully developed uterus and ovaries, but
also develops masculine external genitalia due to the exposure to
high levels of androgen. 68 This individual may have an abnormally
large clitoris that resembles a penis, no visibly apparent vagina, ex-
cessive hair, and possibly a deep voice.69
2. Chromosomal Disorders
A person could have a variety of combinations of sex chromo-
somes, such as XXY, XYY, or X, yet be completely unaware of
this condition for some time.70 Most chromosomal disorders are
not discovered until puberty, if they are discovered at all.7 All of
these chromosomal conditions cause, at least, a "misidentification"
63. Id. (discussing the physical ambiguity as a "significantly small penis ... varia-
ble degrees of scrotal development, and undescended testes.").
64. Id.
65. Id. (noting that with penile growth and testicular descent, the person's gender
identity may shift from female to male).
66. A chromosomal female is defined as a female with XX chromosomes. Id. at
205-06.
67. Hermer, supra note 1, at 206; Medical Dictionary, at http://www.medical-dic-
tionary. com (last visited April 5, 2003).
68. Hermer, supra note 1 at 206.
69. Medical Dictionary, at http://www.medical-dictionary.com (last visited April 5,
2003); see Hermer, supra note 1, at 206. Hermer notes that most intersex individuals
with this disorder in the United States are raised as females, but are occasionally
raised as males. Id.
70. Many of these disorders are not discovered until puberty, therefore, the child,
and possibly the parents, are unaware of the condition for eleven to twelve years.
Greenberg, supra note 56, at 283-85.
71. For example, in the Australian case In re Marriage of C. and D., 35 F.L.R. 340
(Austl. 1979), the husband was unaware of his intersexuality until age twenty-one. See
Leane Renee, Impossible Existence: The Clash of Transsexuals, Bipolar Categories,
and Law, 5 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 343, 366 (1997) (discussing the Aus-
tralian court's decision to invalidate an eleven year marriage because the husband was
anatomically both male and female, therefore, there was never a union between a
man and a woman).
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of sex at birth because they cause the physical appearance of one
sex or gender while the chromosomes indicate another.72
a. Klinefelter Syndrome
Males 73 with Klinefelter Syndrome have two or more X chromo-
somes and a Y chromosome.74 Persons with this condition have a
penis and testes, although smaller than normal, and discover the
disorder only when breasts develop during puberty.75 Most indi-
viduals with this syndrome are raised as males and their gender
identity is male.76 In addition, many males with this syndrome take
hormones in order to appear more masculine after feminizing dur-
ing puberty.77
b. Turner Syndrome
Turner Syndrome, another chromosomal abnormality, exists
when only one X chromosome is present, causing a failure of the
gonads to respond to pituitary hormone stimulation.78 Thus, the
individual has limited sexual maturation.79 A person with Turner
Syndrome appears physically female, but has nonfunctioning
gonads that cannot be defined as either testes or ovaries.80 This
condition is not evident at birth and may be overlooked for some
time.81 These individuals are usually diagnosed during puberty be-
72. "Misidentification" is used because the child is identified as one gender, but
has unapparent characteristics of another gender leaving no way to tell at birth with
which gender that child will identify.
73. A child with this syndrome is usually identified as male at birth. Greenberg,
supra note 56, at 283.
74. TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1056 (17th ed. 1993); Green-
berg, supra note 56, at 283.
75. Greenberg, supra note 56, at 283.
76. Id. Identifying as male indicates that the person views himself as a man and is
comfortable in that gender. See Coombs, supra note 3, at 237-42 (discussing sexual
identity in terms of transgenderism). Individuals whose gender identity does not con-
form to their physical sex characteristics are said to have gender dysphoria. Green-
berg, supra note 56, at 288.
77. Greenberg, supra note 56, at 283.
78. TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 2058 (17th ed. 1993); Green-
berg, supra note 56, at 284.
79. TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 2058 (17th ed. 1993).
80. Greenberg, supra note 56, at 284. The gonads of a person affected by this
syndrome are unidentifiable and often referred to as "streak." Id.
81. Id.
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cause there is limited breast development and a failure to
menstruate.82
c. Swyer Syndrome
Yet another chromosomal abnormality that is not apparent until
puberty is Swyer Syndrome.83 In this situation, the person has XY
chromosomes, but the Y chromosome is missing the sex-determin-
ing segment.84 Without this segment, the fetus is unable to produce
masculinizing hormones or develop testes and develops as an ex-
ternally physical female. This condition, again, is generally diag-
nosed when the individual fails to develop breasts or menstruate at
puberty.86
3. Physical Ambiguity
Another form of intersexuality is the presence of ambiguous
genitalia at birth, including clitoromegaly,87 micropenis,88 or hypos-
padias.89 These conditions are usually surgically "corrected" at
birth.9° The infant is assigned a gender, which is recorded on the
birth certificate, determining this person's legal sex regardless of
her psychological or chromosomal identity.91
C. Case Law Regarding Intersex Individuals
Marriage, in every state, is limited to a union between one
"man" and one "woman. '92 In other words, marriage is limited to
82. Id. Also, Greenberg notes that individuals with this syndrome are able to
menstruate and can also carry a child to term, though only through in vitro fertiliza-
tion, with proper hormonal treatment. Id. at 284 n.110.
83. Id. at 284.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Clitoromegaly is defined as an enlarged clitoris. TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDI-
CAL DICTIONARY 401 (17th ed. 1993).
88. Micropenis is defined as an abnormally small penis. Id. at 1216; see also Medi-
cal Dictionary, at http://www.medial-dictionary.com (last visited April 5, 2003).
89. Hypospadias is defined as an abnormal opening of the male urethra on the
underside of the penis or a urethral opening into the vagina. TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC
MEDICAL DICTIONARY 950 (17th ed. 1993). These ambiguities may be caused by one
of the hormonal or chromosomal disorders discussed in Parts I.B.1 or I.B.2. See
Hermer, supra note 1, at 205-09.
90. Ford, supra note 1, at 470-71. Currently, there is a substantial amount of de-
bate occurring as to whether intersex infants' physically ambiguous genitalia should
be surgically altered at birth. See id.
91. Id. at 471-72.
92. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 300 (1994); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 89 (1999);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 650 (1998); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-03-1 (2001);
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apparently heterosexual couples.9 3 Though there is much debate
over whether to give full marriage rights to same-sex couples,94 a
question also remains as to whom intersex individuals can validly
marry.95 Since their sexual characteristics are ambiguous, the ques-
tion arises: when are intersex individuals considered to be in an
apparently heterosexual relationship? 96  If their chromosomal
makeup is incongruent with their physical sex characteristics, or
their physical sex characteristics are ambiguous at best, then what
criteria determine whether they are in a heterosexual marriage for
the purposes of these statutes? Is it even possible for an intersex
person to be a part of an opposite sex couple? There are no recent
United States cases challenging the validity of a marriage where
one of the partners is intersex, and few United States cases involv-
ing this issue in general.9 Case law involving marriages where one
partner is a transsexual is analogous, however, because post-opera-
tively they also have ambiguous sex characteristics. These cases
can be examined in the absence of case law involving the intersex.
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.001 (1998). All of the statutes limit marriage to a union
between one man and one woman, without defining these terms, or invalidate mar-
riages between persons of the same sex, and are only a few examples of a majority of
state statutes. Even though Vermont has a comparable civil union statute, the state
still does not recognize same-sex marriage. Although two people in a civil union re-
ceive the same tangible benefits as a married couple, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204
(2000), available at http://www.sec.state.vt. us/otherprg/civilunions/civilunionlaw.html
(last visited April 5, 2003), the separate classification implies a "second-class" citizen
status. See, e.g., Evan Wolfson, All Together Now, THE ADVOCATE, Sept. 11, 2001,
available at http://www.freedomtomarry.org/ftm-blueprint. htm (last visited July 4,
2003).
93. These couples are "apparently" heterosexual because the law would presuma-
bly validate a marriage between a lesbian woman and a gay man, neither of whom are
heterosexual, but the couple appears to be. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
Theses statutes base the restriction solely on physically being male or female, there is
no mention of sexual identity. Id; see also Strasser, supra note 40, at 74-80 (discussing
the implications of a statute tailored to the orientation of the parties).
94. Compare The Freedom to Marry Collaborative, at http://freedomtomarry.org
(last visited April 5, 2003), and Strasser, supra note 40, at 61 (asserting that the same-
sex marriage ban violates the equal protection clause), with Dent, supra note 2, and
Wardle, supra note 3 (both supporting the limitation on marriage).
95. See infra Part II.A.1.
96. Apparent heterosexuality is the necessary condition according to the statutes
because, presumably, a lesbian could marry a gay man with no problem. See supra
notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
97. There seems to be only one U.S. case that involved a challenge to a marriage
where one of the partners was a "hermaphrodite." This case was decided in 1878.
The brief opinion stated that because the appellant knew of his wife's "malformation"
when he entered the marriage, he had no right to complain thirteen years later.
Peipho v. Peipho, 88 I11. 438, 438 (1878).
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1. Transsexual Case Law as a Guide
a. Littleton v. Prange98
Christie Lee Littleton, although her chromosomal makeup was
never tested, was born with normal male genitalia. 99 Christie iden-
tified as being female since she was approximately three years
old. 00 She underwent sex reassignment surgery in her twenties
and had her birth certificate legally changed to reflect her female
gender.10 Christie then married a genetic man, Jonathon Lit-
tleton, °2 with whom she lived for seven years.0 3 Upon his death,
Christie initiated a wrongful death action against one of Jonathon's
doctors in her capacity as Jonathon's surviving spouse.10 4 The doc-
tor challenged Christie's standing, asserting that she could not le-
gally be Jonathon's surviving spouse because she was legally a man
and Texas does not allow marriage between two people of the same
sex.10
5
The Court of Appeals of Texas, Fourth District, determined that
the issue of whether Christie was a man or a woman was a matter
of law, thus the judge, rather than a jury, would decide the issue. 106
Although the court mentioned such factors as gonads, genitalia,
chromosomes, and psychological makeup as being important to de-
termine Christie's sex,' 0 7 it primarily considered genitalia at birth
98. 9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. App. 1999).
99. Id. at 224.
100. Id. See supra note 76 and accompanying text for an explanation of the phrase
"identify as."
101. Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 225.
102. There was no allegation of fraud or misrepresentation in the case; Christie
stated in her affidavit that Jonathon was fully aware of her surgery. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 230. The court used the factors used in Corbett v. Corbett, 2 All E.R. 33,
44 (1970), to determine this issue. Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 230-31. Corbett is an English
case that used four factors (gonads, genitalia, chromosomes, and psychological iden-
tity) to determine the sex of a transsexual who fraudulently induced her husband into
believing she was a genetic woman. Corbett, 2 All. E.R. at 44. Further, the Court of
Appeals did not fully explain why it decided to treat this issue as a matter of law. The
defendant doctor moved for summary judgment. Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 229. The test
for summary judgment is, viewing the facts most favorable to the non-moving party,
determining whether there is a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 232 (Lopez, J.,
dissenting). The court refused to look at Christie's amended birth certificate and
looked at her original birth certificate instead. Id. at 231. The two documents seem to
raise a genuine issue of material fact as to Christie's sex. Id. at 232 (Lopez, J., dissent-
ing). If the court had found the issue of determining Christie's sex a matter of fact
instead of law, then the case would have gone to a jury.
107. Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 227.
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and presumed chromosomes." 8 The court relied heavily on the
fact that Christie was physically male at birth and deduced from
this fact that Christie must have male, or XY chromosomes. °9 The
court then stated, "[M]ale chromosomes do not change with either
hormonal treatment or sex reassignment surgery. ' 110 The court
concluded that because Christie presumably had male chromo-
somes, she was still male and, therefore, could not be legally mar-
ried to another male.'
b. In re Estate of Gardiner"'
This case also involved a challenge by a third party to a marriage
where one of the partners was a transsexual.1 3 J'Noel Gardiner
was born with normal male genitalia, but viewed herself as female
from puberty." 4 J'Noel's chromosomes are presumably unt-
ested. 115 She underwent sex reassignment surgery beginning in
1991, completed reassignment in 1994, and eventually married a
genetic male, Marshall Gardiner.116 As in Littleton, there was no
evidence of fraud in J'Noel and her husband's one-year mar-
riage."' Marshall Gardiner died intestate; his son then challenged
the validity of the marriage, alleging that J'Noel was a man for the
purposes of marriage in Kansas." 8
108. Id. at 230-31.
109. Id. at 230. Christie's chromosomes were never tested, therefore, Chief Justice
Hardberger was assuming her chromosomal makeup solely from her physical appear-
ance at birth. Id. at 231. Additionally, Chief Justice Hardberger relied on Christie's
original birth certificate and not her amended one. Id. An inference could be drawn
that because Texas allows one to amend the sex on her birth certificate that they
implicitly recognize that a change in sex is possible. See, e.g., Coombs, supra note 3, at
256 (discussing a case in which a California court held that a California statute recog-
nized the validity of one's post-operative sex by providing for a change of gender
designation on a birth certificate). The court dispelled this inference by interpreting
the intention of the legislature, stating the amendment was intended for "inaccura-
cies." Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 231.
110. Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 230.
111. Id. at 231.
112. 42 P.3d 120 (Kan. 2002).
113. Id. at 121-22.
114. Id.
115. See id. at 122-23 (discussing J'Noel's medical history and failing to mention her
chromosomes, only discussing her physical sex at birth and her sex reassignment
surgery).
116. Id. J'Noel began reassignment in 1991 with electrolysis and finished in 1994
with the construction of a vagina, labia, and clitoris. Id.
117. Id. The petitioner, the deceased's son, alleged that J'Noel never told her hus-
band about her sex reassignment, but there was no evidence to support this allegation.
Id.
118. Id. at 123.
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The Kansas Supreme Court discussed the relevant cases at
length, but relied mainly on Littleton.119 The court cited Littleton
with approval, noting that a male-to-female transsexual may ap-
pear to be a woman, but medical science cannot change a person's
legal sex from male at birth to female. 2 ° Although the court ac-
knowledged that by deeming male-to-female transsexuals male,
Littleton would allow a male-to-female transsexual to marry a wo-
man,'12 it attempted to avoid the loophole by relying on a 1970
version of Webster's Dictionary to define male, female, and sex.122
The court followed the dictionary's definition and defined male as
one who begets offspring and female as one who produces ova and
bears offspring. 23 The court stated that these definitions simply do
not encompass transsexuals. 124  The court concluded that since
J'Noel did not fit within the meaning of female, she could not le-
gally be married to a male. 25
c. In re Ladrach12 6
Elaine Frances Ladrach is a male-to-female transsexual who at-
tempted to obtain a marriage license from the state of Ohio to
marry a genetic male. 27 As in the previous two cases, Elaine was
born with normal male genitalia and was designated male on her
birth certificate. 2 8 Elaine's chromosomes were also untested.1 2
9
She underwent sex reassignment surgery and appeared externally
physically female. 130 Elaine sought a declaratory judgment that she
119. Id. at 135. The court discussed MT. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1976), Anonymous v. Weiner, 270 N.Y.S.2d 319 (Sup. Ct. 1966), In re Ladrach,
513 N.E.2d 828 (Ohio 1987), Corbett v. Corbett, 2 All E.R. 33 (1970), but ultimately
based its decision on the Littleton view that a transsexual "inhabits ... a male body in
all aspects other than what the physicians have supplied." Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 135
(internal quotations omitted).
120. Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 135 (relying on the "ordinary meaning" of male and fe-
male and stating that transsexuals do not fit within these definitions).
121. Id. at 126. A male-to-female transsexual in Texas can apparently marry a ge-
netic woman because she is legally male. See infra note 168 and accompanying text.
122. Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 135.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 137.
126. 513 N.E.2d 828 (Ohio 1987).
127. Id. at 829. The majority in Littleton relied, in part, upon this case in their
analysis. Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 228-29 (Tex. App. 1999).
128. Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d at 829.
129. Id. at 830.
130. Id. The doctor conceded that if Elaine's chromosomes were to be tested, they
would probably be male. Id.
2022
GENDER RESTRICTION ON MARRIAGE
be deemed female for all legal purposes, including amending her
birth certificate and obtaining a marriage license as a female.3
The Ohio Probate Court, applying a similar analysis to that in
Littleton, determined that because Elaine was physically a male at
birth and presumably had male chromosomes, she was not entitled
to change her birth certificate or obtain a marriage license as a
female. 32 The court primarily relied on a 1966 New York Supreme
Court case where that court based its decision on a recommenda-
tion of the New York Academy of Medicine that the sex listed on
birth certificates should not be changed to help "psychologically
ill" people.1 33
d. M.T. v.J.T.1
M.T. v. J.T. represents one of the few favorable cases for
transsexuals. In this case, M.T., a transsexual, filed a complaint for
maintenance and support after J.T., a genetic male, left the mar-
riage. 5 There was no allegation of fraud,136 in fact, J.T. paid for
M.T.'s sex reassignment surgery.137 M.T. was born a physically
normal male, but felt as though she were a woman since at least
age fourteen.138 The court noted that no one, to its knowledge, had
tested M.T.'s chromosomes. 139 She underwent full sex reassign-
ment in 1971 and married J.T. one year later.140
In determining M.T.'s sex, the court noted that the sex reassign-
ment surgery gave M.T. the physical appearance of a woman and
that she was able to engage in heterosexual sex.14 ' After hearing
testimony from several expert medical witnesses, the trial court
found that M.T. was psychologically a female throughout her life
and the sex reassignment surgery conformed her outward appear-
131. Id. at 829-30.
132. Id. at 832.
133. Id. at 830-31 (citing Anonymous v. Weiner, 270 N.Y.S.2d 319, 322 (Sup. Ct.
1966) which denied an application to amend the birth certificate of a transsexual
based on these recommendations).
134. 355 A.2d 204 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
135. Id. at 205.
136. Id. (indicating that J.T. paid for the sex reassignment surgery, negating any
fraud implication).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 206.
140. Id. at 205.
141. Id. at 206.
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ance to her psychological identity. 142 M.T., therefore, was legally
female at the time of the marriage.143
In affirming the trial court, the New Jersey Appellate Division
held that a post-operative transsexual's genitalia and identity can
be harmonized through medical treatment. 44 In view of the fact
that M.T. "has become physically and psychologically unified and
fully capable of sexual activity," the court held she should be con-
sidered a woman for marital purposes. 45 Unlike previous cases,
the court recognized the change of sex from male to female by us-
ing a multi-factor test.146 The court did not rely solely on chromo-
somes or a pronouncement that sex is "fixed by the Creator at
birth.' 1 47 The court looked at all of the indicia of sex, including
physical appearance and gender identity, and concluded that chro-
mosomes were only a small part of the analysis. 48
II. EXTRAPOLATING THE CASE LAW
A. Consequences for Marriage
1. Impact on an Intersex Individual's Right to Marry
Although there are no recent United States cases directly chal-
lenging the validity of a marriage involving an intersex person, the
impact of decisions such as Littleton and In re Gardiner on intersex
people is considerable. 49 It is estimated that one in two thousand
infants in the United States is affected by an intersex condition. 50
Even more people may unknowingly have ambiguous chromo-
somes, that is, neither XX nor XY, but a different combination. 151
142. Id. at 211.
143. Id. at 207.
144. Id. at 211.
145. Id.
146. In Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 227 (Tex. App. 1999), the court used a
multi-factor test by stating that gonads, chromosomes, genitalia, and psychological
makeup are important, but relied on presumed chromosomes. In contrast, the New
Jersey Appellate Division examined and gave considerable weight to each of these
factors in determining M.T.'s sex. M.T., 355 A.2d at 208-10.
147. See Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 224, 231 (answering in the affirmative Chief Justice
Hardberger's question whether "a person's gender [is] immutably fixed by our Crea-
tor at birth" by stating "Christie was created ... male" and holding her male as a
matter of law).
148. M.T., 355 A.2d at 206-07.
149. See supra Part I.C.
150. Hermer, supra note 1, at 195.
151. Greenberg, supra note 56, at 283.
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After Littleton and others, a far greater number of people are ex-
cluded from marriage than originally anticipated. 152
Littleton purports to conform to Texas's ban on same-sex mar-
riage, announcing that because the plaintiff presumably has XY
chromosomes, she is male and cannot marry another male. 53
Since intersex people either have both male and female or other-
wise ambiguous physical characteristics, or they have chromosomes
that are inconsistent with their physical characteristics, the ques-
tion remains: Who may an intersex person legally marry?154
If a person was raised as a woman, has female external genitalia,
but recently discovered that she has AIS and has XY chromo-
somes, would the Court of Appeals of Texas, Fourth Circuit, still
deem this person a man? 155 The court might say that this situation
is distinguishable because this person was created this way and did
not voluntarily undergo sex reassignment surgery156 The court
might also say her sex at birth was female because sex is deter-
mined by external genitalia at birth and, therefore, she is legally a
female despite her chromosomes. 157 If the latter is the case, the
court is determining legal sex on the basis of physical characteris-
tics at birth alone.
The next issue that arises is classification of an intersex person
who has 5-A-R D. 158 For example, if a child was designated female
at birth, but whose body masculinized at puberty, would a court
deem this person a man because she has XY chromosomes?
159
152. See supra Part I.C. After decisions such as Littleton, the reach of the exclusion
extends to every person who unknowingly has chromosomes that are inconsistent
with their external physical characteristics. See infra Part III.
153. Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 231 (Tex. App. 1999).
154. See, e.g., INTERSEX SOCIETY OF NORTH AMERICA, INTERSEXUALITY AND THE
LAW, at http://www.isna.org/library/legal.html (last visited April 5, 2003) (discussing
the questions that arise after Littleton).
155. This has implications for heterosexual marriage as well. If a woman never
realizes that she has AIS or has a chromosomal makeup other than XX, then her
marriage could be challenged and found invalid. See Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 231 (bas-
ing determination on presumed chromosomes; if actual chromosomes were tested, it
is possible that the court would rely directly on chromosomes); Katrina C. Rose, 70 U.
Mo. KAN. CITY L. REV. 257, 262 (2001) (noting that some people are unaware their
chromosomes are not "XX" or "XY").
156. The court in Littleton relied on the fact Christie was born a man, implying that
her gender was "immutably fixed by [the] Creator at birth." Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at
224, 231.
157. See, e.g., id. at 231 (stating that Christie's sex at birth was male and that "some
things we cannot will into being. They just are.").
158. See supra Part I.B.1.
159. See Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 230 (deeming, in effect, a person with XY chromo-
somes male).
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Klinefelter Syndrome also poses a serious problem for courts be-
cause the individual appears physically male at birth, yet develops
breasts during puberty. 161 Would a court deem this person a man
because male genitalia were present at birth even though there are
XX chromosomes? Or does the presence of a Y chromosome
make a person male? In these situations, the court may use physi-
cal sex at birth to determine the person's gender.161 Sex, however,
is not always clear at birth.162 These questions will continue to sur-
face if the courts continue to adjudicate gender.163
If marriage is a fundamental right, 64 limited to opposite sex, or
apparently heterosexual couples, classifying an intersex person be-
comes extremely important.165 The courts will have to define what
constitutes an "opposite sex" couple in order to determine whether
that couple may exercise their fundamental right to marry. 166
The hypothetical case where a physical female discovers that her
chromosomes are neither XX nor XY and she is not, therefore, in
one of the two binary categories of male and female, illustrates the
difficulty courts face in defining an "opposite sex" couple. Courts
faced with this situation could find this person to be a woman if
female genitalia were present at birth and she was raised as a fe-
male, regardless of her chromosomal make up.167 This is arguably
incongruous with a court deciding that a person who identifies as a
woman and has chosen to conform her external physical character-
160. See supra Part I.B.2.a.
161. See In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120, 137 (Kan. 2002) (holding J'Noel a
male for purposes of marriage because she was born a male and transsexuals do not
fit within the meaning of "male" and "female").
162. See supra Part I.B.
163. See Rose, supra note 54, at 10 (noting that doctors are discovering a great
many variations in chromosomal combinations). This indicates that there are a vari-
ety of conditions, some possibly not yet known, that could be considered intersex and
would fall outside the traditional definition of man or woman. A problem could arise
if a person with either condition allowed his or her body to change and identified as
the opposite sex of that which they were designated at birth. For example, if a person
with 5-A-R D who was designated female at birth identified as a male, allowed his
body to masculinize, and underwent full sex reassignment surgery, would the presence
of male physical characteristics and male chromosomes be enough for the Texas
court? Or would this person still be considered female because there were female
physical characteristics at birth?
164. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978).
165. An intersex person's right to marry a particular person depends solely on his
or her classification as male or female because the couple needs to be apparently
heterosexual. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
166. See Coombs, supra note 3, at 251-58 (discussing various courts' approaches to
classifying transsexuals into either male or female).
167. See Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 231 (Tex. App. 1999) (stating that Chris-
tie was created and born a male).
2026
2003] GENDER RESTRICTION ON MARRIAGE
istics to that of a woman is not a woman because of her chromo-
somes. Yet the latter is what can be inferred from Littleton; that if
a person has XY chromosomes, that person will be deemed a man
for purposes of marriage, regardless of whether the person was
raised a as a female. 68
A person who is a combination of the binary characteristics may
thus be entirely deprived of their fundamental right to marry be-
cause for whomever they choose, there is an argument that it is a
same-sex marriage.1 69 Excluding an entire group of citizens from
exercising their fundamental right to marry because they fail to
conform to traditional definitions of "male" and "female" has no
rational basis and serves no legitimate purpose. 17 0 Excluding indi-
viduals classified as intersex from marriage would be unconstitu-
tional because a group of people cannot legitimately be denied a
fundamental right without a sufficiently important governmental
interest.17 1 Since an intersex individual is a combination of male
168. Id. Two or three lesbian couples in Texas have been able to obtain marriage
licenses and legally marry because one of the women is a male-to-female transsexual.
See Lesbian Couple Get a Marriage License, SAN ANTONIO EXPREss-NEWS, June 12,
2001, available at 2001 WL 22457047; see also John Gutierrez-Mier, Two More Women
Obtain County Marriage License: One Member of Couple Was Born a Man, SAN
ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Sept. 21, 2000, available at 2000 WL 27329428. Since she
presumably has XY chromosomes, she is deemed a man and is able to marry a genetic
woman. Id.
169. See Coombs, supra note 3, at 257-60 (discussing the difficulties courts face in
determining an opposite sex couple when one of the parties is a transsexual); see also
supra Part I.C.
170. There does not seem to be a legitimate, rational reason why this group of
people could be excluded from marriage based on the fact that they are a combina-
tion of male and female characteristics-especially considering there is an argument
that the couple is "opposite sex" when one of the partners is intersex. See generally
Coombs, supra note 3 at 224-26 (discussing transgender marriages as a challenge to
opponents of same-sex marriage); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2485
(2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that the Court is likely to apply "a more
searching form of rational basis review" when the legislation "inhibits personal rela-
tionships"); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 406 (1978) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(stating that clumsy, irrational classifications cannot withstand the heightened scru-
tiny involved when a fundamental right is affected).
171. See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 388 (holding a classification that significantly inter-
feres with a fundamental right must be supported by important state interests and
closely tailored to effectuate those interests). The interest most often asserted in re-
taining the limitation on marriage to between one man and one woman is preserva-
tion of public morals, that is, marriage is a unique relationship between a man and a
woman with a public status that the state has an interest in regulating. See Wardle,
supra note 3, at 751. This interest, though, does not seem sufficient to support the
total exclusion of intersexuals nor does the exclusion seem closely tailored to serve
this interest because it potentially excludes individuals who would otherwise fit within
the definition of "male" and "female," such as those who are unknowingly intersex.
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and female sex characteristics, that person could potentially marry
either a man or a woman because, regardless of the sex of the part-
ner, there is an argument that the couple is apparently heterosex-
ual. 7 2 If this person can marry either a man or a woman, then
there seems to be no rational reason why others should be limited
by their gender.'73
2. Impact on Marriage Between Two People of the Same-Sex
Intersex classification problems and decisions regarding
transsexual marriages also have a considerable impact on the same-
sex marriage debate.174 Many of the issues that arise in defining an
opposite sex couple also arise when defining a same-sex couple.
The court in Littleton found that Christie and Jonathon's marriage
was a same-sex marriage, prohibited by Texas, 7 5 even though
Christie's physical anatomy was female and Jonathon's was
male. 76 If anatomy is irrelevant, the court would have to dismiss a
challenge to any couple who had the same external anatomy, but
opposite sex chromosomes. 177 Most people would consider a
couple where both partners have the same external genitalia to be
same-sex, but apparently these courts, were they to be faithful to
their own analysis, could not. 178
Defining a same-sex couple, as noted, presents several questions.
For instance, how would courts classify a couple where one partner
is intersex and displays both male and female external physical
characteristics or an intersex person who has chromosomes that are
inconsistent with her anatomy? In the preceding section, it was
See supra Part II.A.1; supra note 155 and accompanying text; see also Lawrence, 123
S. Ct. at 2486 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Moral disapproval of a group ... is an interest that is insufficient to satisfy
rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause ... we have never
held that moral disapproval, without any other asserted state interest, is a
sufficient rationale under the Equal Protection Clause to justify a law that
discriminates among groups of persons.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
172. See infra Part III.
173. See infra Part II.B.
174. See Coombs, supra note 3, at 220-23.
175. Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 231 (Tex. App. 1999).
176. Id. at 230-31.
177. See supra note 168. Any of the marriages mentioned would have to be upheld
under this rationale. To date, the case law addressing same-sex marriage has not ex-
amined this argument.
178. See In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120, 125 (Kan. 2002); In re Ladrach, 513
N.E.2d 828, 832 (Ohio 1987); Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 230-31.
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noted that a court could deem an intersexual who had AIS179 a
woman because she was created that way.18 ° This seems inconsis-
tent with the Littleton conclusion because Christie had female ex-
ternal organs and presumably male chromosomes. 181 If a court
were to adhere to the reasoning in Littleton, it could find that an
individual with AIS is a male for the purposes of marriage.182 This
is illustrated by male-to-female transsexuals legally marrying ge-
netic females in Texas. 83 In other words, there is no difference
between an intersexual who has XY chromosomes but external fe-
male anatomy and a post-operative male to female transsexual who
has XY chromosomes. 184 The fact that one person was born with
external female genitalia and the other person was not would be a
completely arbitrary distinction.1 8 5 Both were born the way they
are, one with AIS and the other with gender dysphoria, 186 and
should not be treated differently with respect to their right to
marry a genetic woman. 187
Further, in Gardiner, the court stated that J'Noel does not fit
within the definition of female, therefore, she is not a female. 88
J'Noel, however, also fails to fit into the traditional meaning of
male. 89 She does not have male external genitalia nor can she be-
get a child.' 90 Following the logic of the Kansas Supreme Court,
179. That is, female external anatomy, but chromosomes that were tested to be
male.
180. See Littleton, 9 S.W3d at 231 (relying on the fact that Christie was born with
male genitalia and stating, "[T]here are some things we cannot will into being. They
just are."). If the court were to deem this person female, then she could not legally
marry a genetic female.
181. Id. at 230-31.
182. Since this individual would have external female characteristics and male chro-
mosomes, just as Christie Littleton, the court could potentially deem this individual
male. See id. at 230.
183. See Phyllis Randolph Frye & Allison Dodi Meiselman, Same-Sex Marriages
Have Existed Legally in the United States for a Long Time Now, 64 ALB. L. REV. 1031,
1033-34 (2001) (observing that several couples that appear to be same-sex, but one
partner is a male-to-female transsexual have gotten legally married in Texas); see also
supra note 168 and accompanying text.
184. Both individuals have the same chromosomal makeup and physical
characteristics.
185. See Frye & Meiselman, supra note 183, at 1047-57 (discussing the implications
of the Littleton decision).
186. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
187. See supra Part I.A.2.
188. In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120, 135 (Kan. 2002).
189. Id. J'Noel falls outside the court's definition of male because she cannot beget
offspring. Id.
190. Id.
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J'Noel is neither male nor female and, therefore, cannot legally
marry anyone.91
According to the preceding, transsexuals are deprived of the fun-
damental right to marry.192 Intersex people would also be pre-
cluded from marrying because they, too, do not come within the
court's "traditional" definition.193 If these definitions are used in
distinguishing between an opposite sex couple and a same-sex
couple, either more couples would fit into the same-sex category or
more people would fall outside of either category. 194 Such narrow
definitions of "male" and "female" exclude more people than first
evident. 195 This threatens to change the status of any apparently
heterosexual marriage with any slight chromosomal or physical va-
riation into a same-sex marriage, and possibly invalidate it com-
pletely because one partner is neither male nor female.' 96
3. Similarly Situated Individuals
Equal protection doctrine states that similarly situated individu-
als are to be treated alike.' 97 If similarly situated individuals are
treated differently with respect to the exercise of a fundamental
right, heightened scrutiny is required 98
An intersex individual is neither clearly a man nor clearly a wo-
man. If an intersex person who has external female characteristics,
but male chromosomes, identifies as a heterosexual female, she
would probably be able to marry a genetic man without much of a
191. The Kansas Supreme Court did find J'Noel male for the purposes of marriage.
Id. at 137. Evidently, J'Noel would be permitted to marry a woman even though the
couple would be apparently homosexual because both partners would have external
female characteristics. The court may void this marriage on public policy grounds
though because both individuals appear to be female and the marriage would appear
to be same-sex.
192. See Coombs, supra note 3, at 221.
193. For example, a person with AIS would have external female genitalia, but no
uterus. Therefore, she would never be able to bear a child. Also, an individual with
Swyer Syndrome and XY chromosomes never develops testes, and therefore would
not be able to beget a child. See supra Parts I.B.1-2.
194. See supra Part I.B.
195. See supra note 143 and accompanying text; see also supra Part I.C & II.A.1.
196. See Frye & Meiselman, supra note 183, at 1049-56.
197. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (stating that
"all persons similarly situated should be treated alike"); see also Lawrence v. Texas,
123 S. Ct. 2472, 2484 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting City of Cleburne and
stating, "The Equal Protection Clause ... is essentially a direction that all persons
similarly situated be treated alike.").
198. See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 470 (Marshall, J., concurring) (indicating that
when fundamental rights are involved, similarly situated individuals deserve to be
treated equally and heightened scrutiny is required when they are not).
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problem. 199 She could also arguably marry a genetic woman under
a Littleton analysis, or any state that relies on chromosomes to de-
termine gender.20 0 A male-to-female transsexual would be simi-
larly situated to this individual with respect to her right to marry a
genetic woman because she also has external female sex character-
istics and male chromosomes.2 Thus, it could be argued that even
though the court may attempt to treat these two individuals differ-
ently, equal protection doctrine requires that they be treated the
same.
202
A genetic woman who identifies herself as a lesbian is similarly
situated to the individuals discussed above. All three individuals
are in seemingly same-sex couples.20 3 The intersex woman, the
male-to-female transsexual, and the lesbian are all externally physi-
cally female; the only difference in sex characteristics between the
three individuals is their chromosomal makeup. If the first two are
able to marry a genetic woman despite outwardly appearing to be a
same-sex couple, then arguably the lesbian must also be able to
marry a genetic woman.20 a Denying a group of people the ability
to exercise a fundamental right in the same manner as another
group, on the basis of one's chromosomes, is unreasonable. No
199. If the individual was raised as a female and identified as such, it is possible that
a court using the multiple factor test would lend little weight to her chromosomes
because she is in the same position as, for example, a genetic woman who has under-
gone a hysterectomy. Both women are externally physically female and raised as
such, but neither have internal female sex organs. See Part III.A.
200. See supra note 168 and accompanying text. This individual has the same char-
acteristics as a male-to-female transsexual. This loophole was avoided by the Gar-
diner court by adhering to a narrow definition of male and female. In re Estate of
Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120, 135 (Kan. 2002).
201. Under a Littleton analysis, a male-to-female transsexual can presumably le-
gally marry a genetic woman. Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 230-31 (Tex. App.
1999); see supra note 168 and accompanying text. If a male-to-female transsexual is
able to marry a genetic woman because of the Littleton loophole, then this intersex
woman could marry a genetic woman as well. Conversely, if this intersex woman is
able to marry a genetic woman, then presumably so could a male-to-female
transsexual.
202. See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439; see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,
447 (1972) (stating that the Equal Protection Clause forbids states from treating peo-
ple differently based on criteria that is unrelated to the objective of the statute... "so
that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike" (internal quotations
omitted)). Distinguishing between the two on the basis that the intersexual was
raised as a female and the transsexual was not is irrational because both appear physi-
cally the same, the only difference in their sex characteristics is their chromosomes.
Chromosomes alone are an arbitrary factor to determine a person's sex or gender.
Therefore, it is unlikely that this would pass the heightened scrutiny required when
burdening a fundamental right. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978).
203. That is, both women have external physical characteristics that are female.
204. See supra Part I.A.
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person has control over their chromosomes, and it is possible not
to know one's exact chromosomal makeup. 205
III. RESOLUTION
As long as the opposite-sex limitation on marriage remains, gen-
der issues will continue to surface. When faced with a case that
challenges the validity of a marriage based on the sex of the partici-
pants, the court must determine the legal sex of each individual.20 6
It is important to discuss how the courts decide whether to deem
an individual male or female. In the cases discussed in this Com-
ment, the courts tend to use a multi-factor test to determine the
individual's sex.207 This section discusses the multi-factor test and
then presents an alternate solution.
A. The Multiple Factor Test
Applying this test, the courts use such factors as chromosomes,
gonads, genitals, and psychological identity to determine gender.208
This test has some value because it allows courts to weigh a variety
of factors and characteristics when determining into which cate-
gory a person fits. This alleviates reliance on chromosomes, ame-
liorating some of the problems associated with marriages involving
an intersex partner.20 9 This test also offers flexibility, allowing the
205. See Rose, supra note 155, at 262; supra Part I.B. Although a state may place
reasonable regulations on marriage, this restriction could not survive heightened scru-
tiny because it directly interferes with the fundamental right to marry in a substantial
way, is not closely tailored, and could not be supported by sufficiently important state
interests. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386-88 (holding statutes that "significantly interfere
with the exercise of a fundamental right" invalid "unless it is supported by sufficiently
important state interests and closely tailored to effectuate only those interests"). The
restriction would not be closely tailored because marriages could be invalidated if one
person does not know her chromosomal makeup. See supra Part I1.A.1. Also, the
arguments in support of the opposite sex limitation on marriage, such as preservation
of public morals or heterosexual marriages as the preferred societal relationship, ulti-
mately fail because it would be possible for a seemingly heterosexual marriage to be
invalidated on the basis of one partner's chromosomes under this restriction. See
Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2486 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting
that moral disapproval alone is not a sufficient rationale to satisfy the Equal Protec-
tion Clause). Compare supra Part II.A.1, and supra Part I.C., with Wardle, supra note
2, at 753-54, and Dent, supra note 1, at 587-99.
206. See supra Part I.C.
207. See, e.g., M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1976); Littleton v.
Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. App. 1999).
208. In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120, 135-36 (Kan. 2002); M.T, 355 A.2d at
208-09; Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 227.
209. See supra Part II.A.1.
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court to give self-identification more weight. 21° An intersex per-
son, however, by definition, has ambiguous sex characteristics, and
thus, her self-identified sex should be determinative; that is, the
sole factor relied upon by a court in that circumstance.211 This
would allow some intersexuals to decide to be in an opposite sex
couple.212
The multiple-factor test would also relieve problems associated
with post-operative transsexual marriages because their physical
appearance and gender identity will conform, leaving chromo-
somes as the only factor on one side, while the other characteristics
are on the other. In addition, this test would solve any problems
with opposite-sex couples in which one partner is unknowingly in-
tersex because, again, the majority of factors would be either male
or female, with only the chromosomes weighing on the other side.
Applying this test, courts use a variety of factors and determine a
person's gender by looking at whether she is predominantly female
or predominantly male.
There are significant problems, however, with the multiple-factor
test. There is no clear indication as to how many of these factors,
or even which ones, are sufficient to indicate maleness or female-
ness.213 This further illustrates the arbitrary nature of the determi-
nation.214 In addition, this test would not help any intersex
individual whose self-identified sex is the same as the sex of the
person she wishes to marry.215 The same problem would arise for
any post-operative transsexual who wants to marry someone of the
same sex as their post-operative sex.216 Also, this test does nothing
in terms of allowing same-sex marriage because it still restricts who
is legally able to marry whom. In application, any judicial test un-
210. See supra Part I.C.l.d.
211. See supra Parts I.B. & II.A.1. If all the factors on each side, male and female,
are relatively equal, then self-determination should be determinative because a court
should not be able to impose its own idea of what an individual's gender is. See infra
Part III.B.
212. If an intersex person wants to marry a genetic man, she could identify herself
as a woman for marriage purposes and, thus, be in an opposite sex couple. A question
still remains whether the courts should ask a person to change her identity in order to
exercise a fundamental right.
213. See supra Part I.B (discussing the variety of factors and weight given to those
factors by each court).
214. See supra Part II.A.1.
215. This could possibly be circumvented by changing one's self-identification, but
is that something society should require of a person?
216. See supra Part II.
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justifiably endorses the view that courts are able, and should, adju-
dicate a person's sex and gender identity.a17
B. Allowing Marriage Between Any Two People
The restriction on marriage, limiting it to between two people of
the opposite sex, has only created problems.218 The limitation
forces courts into the business of determining a person's legal sex,
sometimes regardless of how she identifies herself.2 19 The limita-
tion has been narrowed further so that in some states it no longer
means between one physical man and one physical woman, but
only between a person with XY chromosomes and a person with
XX chromosomes.2 This limitation forces courts or legislatures to
define who is a "man" and "woman. '221 The courts are forced to
place people into one of two categories even when the person does
not seem to fit in either.222 Through this limitation on marriage
judges and legislators are allowed to impose their own ideas of
what a man or a woman should be onto society .223
This is not a decision that should be left to the courts to decide.
If the government cannot unreasonably search one's home, 24 pre-
vent adults from obtaining contraception,225 or criminalize private,
consensual, intimate conduct,226 then courts should not, in applying
a state's marriage laws, be permitted to question the sex or gender
of a person. Allowing them to do so only leads to extremely incon-
sistent and arbitrary results throughout the country.227 An intersex
person has no viable option if courts simply decide that sex or gen-
der is binary and act as the sole decision-makers, determining
which individuals fall into each category.
Imposing these categorical definitions on marriage, as the case
law illustrates, is socially constructing gender to conform to the
traditional view that men are masculine and woman are feminine
217. See Coombs, supra note 3, at 257-64; see also Rose, supra note 155, at 261-63,
299-301.
218. See supra Parts I.C. & II.
219. See Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 226 (Tex. App. 1999).
220. Id. at 230-31.
221. See supra Part I.C.
222. See id.
223. See id.
224. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
225. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965).
226. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2484 (2003).
227. See supra Part I.C.
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under the guise of biology and chromosomes . 2 8 The limitation on
marriage effectively punishes those who cross gender boundaries.
Accordingly, a court, despite Littleton, would probably find a wo-
man who later finds out she has AIS and XY chromosomes to still
be a woman, because she did not intentionally cross any gender
boundary.22 9 This woman is not situated differently from the wo-
man who has both male and female genitalia but identifies as a
woman, or the psychological woman who was born with a penis but
chose to change her physical body to conform to her psychological
identity. To treat these women differently, allowing one "XY" wo-
man to marry a genetic man and not the others, violates the Equal
Protection Clause because similarly situated individuals are being
singled out for disfavored treatment with respect to their funda-
mental right to marry.23°
If courts remain involved in determining a person's gender, an
intersex individual should be able to self-designate because the
physical characteristics are ambiguous.2 31 This self-designation
should be the determining factor. The only rational conclusion for
an intersex individual is allowing her to marry either a man or a
woman because her sex characteristics are ambiguous, and there-
fore, with either a man or a woman she could potentially be in an
opposite sex couple.232 The only distinction between an intersex
individual who is externally physically female, a male-to-female
transsexual, and a lesbian is the chromosomal makeup. This dis-
tinction is arbitrary because many people do not know their exact
chromosomal makeup or how a slight variation may or may not
have an effect on their lives. 33 It would be incredibly difficult,
therefore, for a state to provide a sufficiently important interest to
justify allowing one to marry a genetic female and not the others
because all three couples would appear same-sex.234 Further, dis-
tinguishing the couples on the basis of their chromosomes would
228. See id.
229. See supra Part II.A.1.
230. See supra Part II.
231. See supra Part I.B.
232. An intersex individual's sex characteristics are ambiguous from birth even
though the ambiguity was not visible at the time, therefore, the court cannot legiti-
mately rely solely on physical sex designation at birth to determine this person's
gender.
233. See Rose, supra note 49, at 262; supra Part I.B.
234. A public morals assertion might fail because all of the couples appear same-
sex.
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not be closely tailored.235 This chromosomal distinction is unrea-
sonable and has no rational relationship to the purpose of the limi-
tation on marriage.236
Allowing individuals the opportunity to marry whomever they
choose would prevent unjust adjudication of sex and gender in
marriage.237 Decisions such as Littleton and Gardiner demonstrate
the illogical results that follow from a judicial determination of
gender identity.238 Courts should not spend time weighing each in-
dicator of sex in an attempt to classify individuals who may not be
classifiable in the binary system239 and should not seek to change a
person's identity, gender or otherwise. The logical conclusion,
aside from denying any couple that does not fit the "XY" and
"XX" model the right to marry, is to allow marriage between any
two people. 240 Any two people who wish to marry should be able
to do so.
CONCLUSION
Marriage is a fundamental right and must be available to every
person, regardless of whether her chromosomal makeup conforms
with her external sex characteristics.2 41 Every person, regardless of
the sex of the person they choose to marry, must be able to exer-
cise her fundamental right to marry with that person.242
Limitations on marriage affect a greater number of people than
is first evident.243 That is, an apparently heterosexual marriage
could be successfully challenged if one person is unknowingly in-
tersex. 244 Confining marriage to between two people of the oppo-
235. The classification would not be closely tailored to the public morals interest
because it could invalidate apparently heterosexual couples if the chromosomal
makeup deviated at all from XX and XY.
236. A distinction based on chromosomes bears no rational relationship to any of
the arguments set forth by opponents of same-sex marriage because a person could
appear to be in a traditional heterosexual marriage, yet have chromosomes that are
inconsistent with their identity and physical appearance. Compare Wardle, supra note
2, at 748-56, and Dent, supra note 1, at 593-607, with supra Part I.B., and supra Part
II.A.1.
237. See supra Part II.
238. See supra Part I.C.
239. See id.
240. See supra Part II.
241. See supra Part II.
242. See supra Part II.
243. See supra Part II.A.1.
244. See supra Part II.A.2.
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site sex leads to problems deciding what an opposite sex couple is
and who defines an opposite sex couple.245
Invariably, courts are in the position of adjudicating a person's
gender in order to decide if a marriage is valid. 46 Do we really
want courts to do this? Even if a person's gender is ambiguous or
fails to fit into one of only two categories, this is not a legitimate
reason to refuse her the fundamental right to marry. 47 An intersex
person should be able to self-designate - courts should not be able
to assign her a sexual identity. This would allow an intersex indi-
vidual to marry either a man or a woman.248 If this person can
marry either a man or a woman, equal protection demands that
other, similarly situated individuals must be able to do the same.249
If so, then why retain any "opposite sex" requirement on marriage
at all? The sex criterion for determining a legal marriage should be
eliminated.
245. See supra Part I.B.
246. See supra Part I.B.
247. See supra Part II.
248. See supra Part II.A.1.
249. See supra Part II.A.3.
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